This paper investigates a secure blind watermarking scheme. The main idea of the scheme not only protects the watermark information but also the embedding positions. To achieve a higher level of security, we propose a sub key generation mechanism based on the singular value decomposition and hash function, where sub keys depend on both the main key and the feature codes of the original image.
Introduction
Digital watermarking is an important technique for protecting the security of information and it is mainly applied in copyright protection. It has been studied more than twenty years since this concept was first proposed in academia [1] . Many watermarking schemes [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] have been proposed, among them, several famous algorithms such as spread spectrum (SS) [2] and quantization index modulation (QIM) [3] are investigated, and the earliest research effort has focused on robustness and embedding distortion. A watermarking system should be robust to various attacks, such as noise, general signal processing and 2 geometric distortions, etc. How to improve robustness has been a hot issue. Some of the recent studies such as Ref. [4] generally represent state-of-the-art algorithm in robustness performance.
Meanwhile, the security problem of watermarking has been attracting more and more attention. Kalker firstly defines watermarking security as "the inability by unauthorized users to access the communication channel" [13] , i.e., to remove, to read, or to write the hidden the message. Later, Comesaña et al. take the view that the goal of security analysis is to gain secret information [14] , e.g. embedding the message and detecting keys. In [15] , Cayre et al. point out that the security analysis should be based on Kerckhoff's principle [16] that means adversaries know the embedding/detecting algorithms except for a secret key. According to Diffie-Hellman's terminology, they group the security attacks of watermarking systems as (i) Watermark only attack (WOA). (ii) Known message attack (KMA). (iii) Known original attack (KOA). Under WOA scenario, Cayre et al. classify the security levels of watermarking schemes： insecurity, key security, subspace security, and stego-security [17] .
In addition, some scholars make quantitative and qualitative analysis on the security of some algorithms, such as SS algorithm [2] and QIM algorithm [3] . Some of watermarking systems are studied in real number field, and the secret keys are real numbers or vectors. On the basis of symmetric cryptography, Bas et al. put forward the concept of the equivalent keys to measure watermarking security [18] . In [3] quantitatively analyze the security of the dither modulation QIM (DM-QIM) algorithm under KMA [19] and WOA [20] scenarios. Their investigations show that the security of both SS and DM-QIM are still very low, although SS and QIM algorithms are generally agreed to have good robustness compared with other algorithms. In that case, it is of significant importance to improve the security of the above algorithms.
Chaotic systems have received great attentions in the past decade due to its inherent properties such as non-periodicity, wide spectrum, sensitive to initial conditions and system parameters, and randomness property. Several chaos-based watermarking algorithms are proposed [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] , where the watermark is embedded in the spatial domain [5] [6] [7] , or in the frequency domain [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . However, most of the algorithms are still easily analyzed from the cryptographic point of view. For example, in Refs. [9] [10] [11] , permutation and encryption techniques are applied to protect the watermark information. We find that they are insecure under Kerckhoff's principle, because we can easily access the embedding positions of the watermark, and then remove the watermark, or replace a new encrypted watermark, or decrypt the watermark. In Refs. [5] [6] [7] , the chaotic sequences are used to determine the embedding positions of the watermark and the embedding positions depend only on the key. As long as we get enough original images and the watermarked images, we can obtain all the embedded positions, i.e., equivalent keys.
In this paper, we attempt to address these security issues. The core idea of the proposed scheme protects not only the watermark information but also the embedding positions. First, an original watermark is encrypted, and then parts of the embedded positions are randomly chosen to embed the encrypted watermark bits. In particular, this process is not only related to the key, but also to the image itself, which will improve the security of the system under the WOA / KOA / KMA scenarios. The main contributions of this paper include: (i) The embedding domain of the proposed scheme is the DCT domain of the scrambled image rather than the DCT domain of the original image. Such improvements try to tackle the contradiction between imperceptibility and robustness; (ii) To resist rotation and translation attacks, a new method based on correlation properties of chaotic sequences is designed, which can accurately estimate geometric transformation parameters; (iii) To resist the cryptanalysis under the WOA / KOA / KMA scenarios, we propose a sub key generation mechanism based on the singular value decomposition and hash function, where sub keys depend on not only the main key but also the feature codes of the image.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic background and theory. Section 3 presents the proposed watermarking scheme in detail. The performance evaluation and security analysis are provided in Section 4 and Sections 5. Finally, a conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
Preliminaries

Singular value decomposition
Singular value decomposition (SVD) is an orthogonal transform and it is defined as 4 1 1, 1  1,  1,1  1,  2  2,1  2,  2,1 2, ,1 
where A is an original matrix of size 
Logistic map
Logistic map is usually used to generate chaotic sequences, and is written as
where  and 0 
where the operation of x   denotes the largest integer not larger than x .
Here we introduce auto-correlation (AC) and cross-correlation (CC) coefficients to evaluate the statistical properties of binary sequences. In [21] , AC of   
Proposed watermarking scheme
A complete digital watermarking system should consist of two parts, a transmitter and a receiver.
The former is to embed watermark, and the latter to extract watermark. In our proposed scheme, the transmitter's architecture is illustrated in Fig. 2 , which is composed of three processes: sub key generation (SKG), embedding processⅠand embedding processⅡ. In SKG sub keys are generated and depended on an original image and a key 1 Key . In the embedding processⅠa Logo watermark is embedded in an original image. Further, in the embedding process Ⅱ, an oriented watermark, i.e., a binary chaotic sequence, is embedded in watermarked image I. In the following sections, we describe each process in detail, and briefly introduce extraction process. 
Sub key generation
The framework of sub key generation is shown in Fig. 3 . The goal of SKG is to produce different sub keys for different original images at the same main key. To better understand the mechanism, we explain it from two aspects of the transmitter and the receiver. (1) Robustness: The feature codes of the original image, the watermarked image and the watermarked image being attacked must be identical, i.e., the feature codes should be robust to a few common attacks.
(2) Distinctiveness: the feature codes should be different for different images. In other words, the contents' feature codes are unique.
To meet the above requirements, a simple but effective extraction method based on SVD is presented as follows:
Step
divide each block into two sub blocks shown in Fig.4 , the sizes of which are nn  . Thus, there exist sub
Step 
Fig. 4
Each block of ( ) ( ) m n m n    is divided into two sub-blocks, the sizes of which are nn  .
Embedding process I
The embedding procedure I is depicted in Figs. 5. A binary logo watermark LW of size HW  is embedded in the original image
and a watermarked image I is
produced. The embedding steps are described as follows:
Step 1. Generate a chaotic sequence
x and further get an index sequence α . After iterating Eq. (2) 
Step 2. Scramble the original image. The original image is scrambled by Step 3. The scrambled image is transformed by using DCT.
Step 4. Encrypt the logo watermark. Take the first HW  elements in the sequence x , calculate Eq. (3), and obtain a binary sequence{ }, 1, 2,...,
The logo watermark is encrypted by , 1, 2,...,
where the symbol  denotes bitwise XOR. j w and j w represent the th j elements of the original and the encrypted logo watermarks, respectively.
Step 5. Generate another chaotic sequence y and get another index sequence β . First, an initial value of Eq. (2) is generated from the sub key SK by the following form Step 7. Obtain the watermarked image I. The embedded image is transformed by using IDCT and inverse permutation, and the watermarked image I is obtained.
Fig.5 Embedding process I: a logo watermark is embedded
Embedding process II
To resist against geometric attacks, a binary chaotic sequence called an oriented watermark is embedded twice after the logo watermark is hidden. The embedding procedure II is illustrated in Fig. 6 , and includes the following two steps:
Step Note that we do not need to record the two directions, but the two directions are symmetrical and their synthetic direction is 90  , further we define it as the marked direction. Then the oriented watermark OW is embedded in the two directions by using QIM method (Eq. (13)) with embedding intensity   .
Fig.6
Embedding process II: the same oriented watermark is embedded twice in the two directions.
Remark 1: By using QIM method, the logo watermark and the oriented watermark are embedded in the frequency and the spatial domains, respectively. The latter's embedding does not affect the former's when the embedding intensities satisfy the following form 1.5     .
Watermark detection and extraction process
The process is shown in Fig.7 , and it can be further divided into two sub processes: the oriented watermark detection process and the logo watermark extraction process. The purpose of the former is to determine the geometric transformation parameters of the attacked image and to rectify and reshape the image based on these parameters, and the purpose of the latter is to extract the logo watermark from the reshaped image.
The oriented watermark detection process is described as follows.
Step 1. Similarly as step 1 in Section 3.3, construct an original oriented watermark OW with 3 Key .
Step 2. Detect the positions and orientations of the two oriented watermarks in the received image.
Choose the central position of the received image as a starting point (i.e., the axis origin), extract the possible binary sequences  OW by using Eq. (14) at the direction of  , where =1 ,2 ,3 ,...,359 ,360
where ,i 
Step 3. Rectify and reshape the image. According to Eq. (15), we rotate the image counterclockwise by   , and obtain a reshaped image.
Remark 2:
Note that the image may suffer from a translation attack. In this case we can translate images by different distances, and then re-performing correlation detection and calculate parameters. Some examples of correlation detection are given in Section 4.5.
The logo watermarking extraction process is the inverse of the embedding process I, which is briefly described in the following steps.
Step 1. Obtain the sub key SK through the SKG process with 1 Key and the reshaped image.
Step 2. Apply permutation and DCT transform on the reshaped image, and then extract the encrypted watermark from the DCT coefficients. Note that the embedding positions are determined by SK , extract the watermark bits from the coefficients of the positions using the Eq. (14).
Step 3. Decrypt the encrypted watermark with 2 Key . 
Simulation results and discussions
In this section, simulation experiments are used to verify the validity of the proposed SKG mechanism, then to demonstrate the superiority and effectiveness of watermark embedded in DCT domain of the scrambled image. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the whole watermarking system in both imperceptibility and robustness.
Experimental setup and evaluation metrics
In the following experiments, five USC-SIPI test gray-scale images with size 512 × 512 are adopted as the original images, including Lena, Barbara, Baboon, Peppers, and Goldhill. A 64 × 64 binary image (BUPT) is chosen as a logo watermark, while two binary pseudo-random sequences of 150-bit are used as an oriented watermark, which is determined by 3 Key , i.e., To quantitatively evaluate the performance of the system, we employ various performance metrics, such as peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR), structural similarity (SSIM) [22] , normalized cross correlation (NC) and bit error rate (BER). PSNR and SSIM are used to evaluate the quality of the watermarked images or the attacked versions. PSNR is defined by the following forms   SSIM is defined by the form 3  1  2   1  2  3  2  2  2  2  1  2  3   2  2  2  SSIM= , 
Effectiveness analysis of the SKG
Feature codes and sub keys for different images
In this experiment, we extract the feature codes of different images and obtain corresponding sub keys. For different security levels, the lengths of the main key can be chosen 128-bit, 256-bit and 512-bit.
In simulations, we take a 128-bits main key 
Robustness of feature codes
The feature codes of transmitter and receiver should be identical in the watermarking system, in other words, the feature codes should be robust to image processing or some attacks. Assume the channel is ideal without noise and any attacks. We can compare the features codes of the original and the watermarked images, and find that the features codes of five pairs of images are synchronous. The results are presented in Table 2 . In fact, the channel is not ideal and there exist noise and malicious attacks. Considering image processing, such as compression, filtering and geometric transformation, we should investigate the features codes of the attacked watermarked image. In particular, we focus on the additive Gaussian white noise (AGWN) and JPEG compression, the results of which are shown in Table 3 In Table 4 , we test the different compression factors for JPEG compression, and we find that the features codes are synchronized if compression factor 10 Q  . Furthermore, we test some other types of attacks, and the results are shown in Table 5 . We find that the feature codes are synchronized under mean filtering (the filter template size is 3×3), Gaussian low pass filtering attacks, the rotation transformation (the rotation angle is 8°) and translation transformation (the translation distance is 40 pixels). But the feature codes designed by us cannot resist the cropping attack (the cropping ratio is 25%), because they are based on blocks. 
Effectiveness of watermark embedded in the DCT domain of the scrambled image
In the proposed scheme, the watermark is embedded in the DCT domain of the scrambled image that has the following two advantages: Table 6 . The average energy rate of five original images is about 90.53%, while the average energy rate of five scrambled images is about 6.26%, being approximately equal to the theoretical value 6.25% (i.e., (128 128 1) (512 512 1)
). region, and the high frequency (HF) region is worst. However, from the Human Visual System (HVS) point of view, the human's eye is very sensitive to the low frequencies and is not sensitive to the high frequency coefficients. To reach a compromise between robustness and visual invisibility, the watermark is usually embedded in the intermediate frequency region. However, the proposed scheme does not need to consider the embedded frequency region, because all frequency regions provide the same robust performance, especially under JPEG compression. In a sense, the proposed scheme solves the contradiction between imperceptibility and robustness.
Next we take the simulation results and prove the above conclusion (ii). For the sake of convenience, we define the upper left corner of the DCT coefficients matrix (size 512×512) as the coordinate origin We present experimental results under AGWN attacks in Figs.10 (c-d) . It can be seen that all the curves are coincident approximately, because the noise generated is independent of the images and its frequency distribution is evenly distributed. 
Imperceptibility evaluation of the watermarking system
There are two watermark embedding procedures in our scheme. First, a logo watermark with 4096 bits capacity is embedded, and then an oriented watermark with 150 bits capacity is embedded twice. In this way, the watermarked images I and the watermarked images II will be output. Table 7 presents the values of PSNR and SSIM for the 5 test images in two embedding processes. From 
Robustness evaluation of the watermarking system
To evaluate watermark robustness to common image processing operations, here we consider AGWN with different intensity, the JPEG compression with different quality factors, rotation and translation transformations, and filtering. The detailed simulation results are listed in Table 8 . To verify the proposed algorithm can resist rotation and translation transformations, we do the following three experiments on Lena image.
E1:
Detection of the oriented watermark without geometric attack. In the embedding process II, the oriented watermark is embedded in 30 and 150 directions, respectively ( Fig.12 (a) ). The receiver extracts the possible binary sequences at all directions, then performs correlation detection with the original oriented watermark. The detection results are shown in Fig.12 (b) .
E2:
Detection of the oriented watermark under a rotation attack. The watermarked image is rotated 8 counterclockwise (Fig.12 (c) ). We detect similarly as E1, and the results are presented in Fig.12 (d) .
E3:
Detection of the oriented watermark under a translation attack. For simplicity, we assume that the watermarked image is shifted 40 pixels in 30 clockwise direction. (Fig.12 (e) ). The receiver extracts the possible binary sequences at different shifting (in 30 clockwise direction) and performs correlation detection with the original oriented watermark. The results are shown in Fig.12(f) . Fig. 12 (a) , while the marked direction 98 indicates to rotate 8 counterclockwise in Fig.12 (c) .
In Fig.12 (f) , obviously we conclude that the received image in Fig.12 (e) is shifted 40 pixels . 
Key space
The key space should be large enough to resist against brute-force attacks. The proposed system uses three types of keys, Now we analyze the whole watermarking system under different attack scenarios. In the WOA scenario, the attacker obtains only a series of watermarked images. Assume that he/she made some statistical analysis in the spatial domain of the watermarked images, but it is difficult to analyze in this case. Because the watermark bit is embedded in the different DCT coefficients for different original images, and after IDCT transform, the watermark bit will spread to the whole space domain.
In the KOA scenario, an attacker can obtain some watermarked images and the corresponding original image. An attacker may best use a differential attack method, i.e., he/she calculates the difference between the watermarked image and the original image to get some information about the keys. But the differences are not the identical, because the selected embedding coefficient depends on not only 1 Key but also the feature codes of different image. So it is difficult to recover the keys.
In the KMA scenario, an attacker collect several watermarked image and watermarks pairs. In this case, he/she may establishes mapping relationship from different watermarks to different watermarked images. It is also difficult to break the system, because as long as the image contents or the feature codes are changed, the embedding positions of the watermark will be changed.
To further demonstrate the high security of the system, we assume that some of the keys are leaked, i.e., or permutation matrix is known to the attacker. The attacker will performs the permutation and DCT transform, then he can guess the embedding position and the embedding order of the watermark. The probability of success can be calculated as the following form This shows that it is almost impossible to extract the correct encrypted watermark without 1 Key .
Furthermore, suppose the attacker already has a part of the sub keys, he/she will predict the main key or the other sub key with less cost. The difficulty of breaking SKG is equivalent to break hash functions.
Based on the above analysis, the security of the proposed watermarking system with SKG is greatly enhanced by one-way hash functions and one-time pad mechanism.
Comparisons with other schemes
In this section, we compare our scheme with two representative watermarking schemes, Liu's scheme [9] and Behina's scheme [5] .They are both blind watermarking algorithm with the secret keys, and simple description of the two algorithms are given here.
Liu's scheme [9] . First, an original watermark is scrambled based on Logistic maps. Then a scrambled watermark is embedded in the sub-band LL2 of DWT coefficients. Note that the parameters of the Logistic system are the secret keys of the watermarking system. Behina's scheme [5] .Three chaotic sequences are generated based on a coupling chaotic system, two of which are used to determine which pixels of the original image and the other to determine which bit-plane in the pixels to embed watermark using the substitution method. The parameters of coupling chaotic system are the secret keys of the watermarking system.
The comparison results are listed in Table 9 . For Liu's scheme, based on Kerckhoff's principle, an attacker is very easy to access the positions of embedding watermark bits. Under WOA or KOA scenarios, He/she can do the following illegal operation, for example, remove the watermark by modifying the DWT coefficients of the watermarked image, extract the encrypted watermark by using same rules, and then embed the extracted encrypted watermarks into other images (i.e., forge the encrypted watermark into a new image). Under the KMA attack, the attacker maybe obtains some original watermarks. By Li's analytical methods [26] , only   2 log 64 64 =12  (where 64 64  denotes the size of the watermark used in [9] ) different known watermarks are needed to acquire the equivalent key, i.e., the permutation matrix. Basing on the above analysis, we know that Liu's scheme is insecure under WOA, KOA and KMA scenarios, and Behina's scheme is insecure under KOA scenario. However it is very difficult to analyze our scheme under these scenarios.
Table 9
The comparisons of the proposed algorithm, Liu's scheme [9] , and Behina's scheme [5] Attribute description Proposed scheme Liu's scheme [9] Behina's scheme [5] Embedding domain
The 
Conclusions
A blind watermarking scheme is presented in the paper, which enhances the security of the with other algorithms, demonstrate that the scheme achieve a high level of security.
